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Abstract 
Environmental policy analyses increasingly require the evaluation of benefits from large changes 
in spatially differentiated public goods.  Such changes are likely to induce general equilibrium effects 
through changes in household expenditures and local migration, yet current practice "transfers" constant 
marginal values for even the largest changes.  Moreover, it ignores important distributional effects of 
policy.   
This paper demonstrates that recently developed locational equilibrium models can provide 
transferable general equilibrium benefit measures.  Our results suggest that taking account of the 
potential for adjustment and household heterogeneity is important.  Applying benefits estimated from this 
method to the effect of the Clean Air Act amendments in Los Angeles, we find that the estimated 
annual general equilibrium benefits in 2000 and 2010 are dramatically different by income group and 
location.  The gains range from $33 to about $2,400 per household.  These differences arise from 
variations in air quality conditions, income, and the effects of general equilibrium price adjustment.   
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General Equilibrium Benefit Transfers for Spatial Externalities:  
Revisiting EPA’s Prospective Analysis 
V. Kerry Smith, Holger Sieg, H.  Spencer Banzhaf, and Randy Walsh∗ 
1.  Introduction 
Environmental policy analyses increasingly require evaluation of the economic gains 
from large changes in spatially differentiated externalities.  As these changes occur, we can 
assume the spatial variation in amenities provides scope for individual adjustment and often an 
observable, general equilibrium response through property markets.  Several conceptual efforts 
have addressed this problem and proposed bounds using partial equilibrium benefit measures to 
approximate the gains from these types of changes.1  By contrast, EPA’s current assessment 
practices ignore these issues.2  Benefit measurement is undertaken as if the policy intervention 
allows households to avoid a set of implicit expenditures.  These avoided costs correspond to the 
monetized health effects that are estimated, in the case of air pollution, with concentration 
response (CR) functions.  CR models link each pollutant to an observable, health-related, event 
                                                 
∗ Kerry Smith is University Distinguished Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, North 
Carolina State University and a University Fellow of Resources for the Future; Holger Sieg is Associate Professor of 
Economics, Carnegie Mellon University; Spencer Banzhaf is a Fellow at Resources for the Future; and Randy 
Walsh is an Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Colorado.  We thank Jim De Mocker of EPA, leader of 
the team of analysts responsible for the Prospective Analysis, for assuring we were able to obtain the data necessary 
to complete this research; Allen Basala and Bryan Hubbell for helping us to understand them; Leland Deck, James 
Neumann, and especially Kenneth Davidson for developing the data to match our modeling needs; and Maureen 
Cropper, Gilbert Metcalf, and Matt Kahn, as well as the participants in NBER’s Empirical Environmental 
Economics Conference, for comments on an earlier draft.  Jaren Pope’s excellent research assistance ensured that 
the numerous Arcview issues required to link the geo-coded air quality data files for the EPA policy scenarios 
considered in this research would be compatible with our economic model.  Susan Hinton ensured the numerous 
drafts were prepared in a timely and consistent form.  Partial support for this research was provided by the National 
Science Foundation NSF-S BR-98-08951, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency R828103 and the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation (for Sieg). 
1 The earliest recognition of these issues can be found in Lind (1973) and Starrett (1981).  Examples of the proposed 
bounds include Bartik (1988) and Kanemoto (1988).  
2 EPA’s two largest benefit-cost assessments have been the Retrospective [1997] and Prospective [1999] Analyses.  
The first examines the period 1970-1990 with and without the Clean Air Act.  The second examines the net gains 
from the 1990 amendments comparing annual net benefits in two years with and without the more stringent emission 
restrictions. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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such as chronic asthmacases or cardiovascular admissions.  In the most serious situations (and 
the ones accounting for the majority of the benefits) the event is a statistical life “saved.”  
People are treated as passive receptors.3  While the unit values attributed to the health 
effects usually correspond to an average willingness to pay (WTP) per case (and not health 
costs), they are assumed to be constant, and independent of the level of the effects and of 
household income.4  There is nothing in current practice that reconciles the independently 
assessed, implicit expenditures with income or considers whether the environmental changes are 
large enough that households would change their behavior.  As a rule, these types of issues are 
dismissed because it is argued that practical versions of economically consistent models, capable 
of being used in a policy context with the level of detail required, do not exist. 
                                                 
3 Under ideal conditions, CR functions might be interpreted as reduced form relationships describing the health 
effect after households had adjusted to their current air quality conditions (see Evans and Smith, 2002).  Using them 
for new situations implies no adjustment of the behavioral pattern from the conditions when they were estimated. 
4 The assumption of no variation in the WTP measure with income is particularly ironic because one of the most 
widely cited criticisms of benefit analysis is that WTP measures used incorporate an implicit acceptance of the 
distribution of income.  A recent example can be found in Heinzerling and Ackerman (2002), who note in their 
executive summary that: 
 
“Cost-benefit analysis is a deeply flawed method that repeatedly leads to  
biased and misleading results.  Far from providing a panacea, cost-benefit  
analysis offers no clear advantages in making regulatory policy decisions  
and often produces inferior results, in terms of both environmental protection  
and overall social welfare…” (p. 1). 
 
These authors highlight the equity issues as one of the four “fatal” flaws, noting that: 
 
“…cost-benefit analysis ignores the question of who suffers as a result of  
environmental problems and, therefore threatens to reinforce existing  
patterns of economic and social inequality…Poor countries, communities,  
and individuals are likely to express less ‘willingness to pay’ to avoid  
environmental harms simply because they have fewer resources.  Therefore,  
cost-benefit analysis would justify imposing greater environmental burdens  
on them than their wealthier counterparts” (p. 2). 
 
As our description suggests, the practice of benefit-cost analyses rarely meet the theoretical idea that Heinzerling 
and Ackerman criticize.  Most policy studies use constant unit values.  Our approach does allow the income 
distribution to be taken into account. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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In previous research we used the locational equilibrium framework to estimate household 
preferences for housing, air quality, and public education for the Los Angeles area (see Sieg et. 
al, [2002a]).  To illustrate how the model performed in measuring the general equilibrium 
benefits, we evaluated the gains due to the actual improvements in ozone between 1990 and 
1995.  This paper considers a different issue, namely, whether the framework can provide 
transferrable general equilibrium benefit measures consistent with the demands of large-scale 
environmental policy analysis.  We show that the locational equilibrium model meets policy 
needs—providing a consistent baseline and accommodating the level of detail inherent in a 
large-scale assessment for a spatial externality.  To develop our findings, we use the EPA 
projected spatial variation in ozone concentrations developed for the recent Clean Air Act 
prospective analysis to compute general equilibrium household adjustment and prices.   
Our results suggest that taking account of the potential for adjustment and household 
heterogeneity is important.  In 2000 and 2010, the estimated annual general equilibrium benefits 
associated with the ozone improvements due to the Clean Air Act amendments (CAAA) are 
dramatically different by income group and location within the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District.5   The gains range from $33 to about $2,400 per household (in 1990 
dollars).6  These differences arise from variations in air quality conditions, income, and the 
effects of general equilibrium price adjustment.  To date, existing methods have been unable to 
consistently measure all of these effects together. 
As we noted at the outset, EPA’s recent benefit-cost analyses for the CAAA regulations 
relies on a damage-cost framework, where benefit estimates are derived by multiplying unit 
values of health-effect changes attributed to changes in pollution (from the estimated CR 
functions) with partial equilibrium unit benefit estimates.  However, analyses of the benefits 
from air quality regulations have not always adopted this logic.  For example, 20 years ago the 
Math-Tech (1983) net benefit analysis of alternative primary national ambient air quality 
standards for particulate matter, developed for EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis at that time, 
used both health effects and other economic models.7  The latter included property value and 
                                                 
5 This area includes most of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino, and Ventura counties. 
6 This range is based on the average welfare gain computed by income quantile in each of the 102 school districts in 
our extended model.  It is the range from the smallest mean to the largest across the school district/quantile groups. 
7 See Palmquist and Smith (2002) for further discussion of this evaluation. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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wage hedonics as well as consumer expenditure models.8  These other approaches offered a 
cross-check and, in the case of the expenditure work, served to evaluate the plausibility of the 
benefit measures.  That is, the estimated expenditure adjustment attributed to air pollution 
changes could be compared to what the adjustments would be for price changes.  At a minimum, 
the locational equilibrium model illustrated here provides another  opportunity to develop these 
types of cross-checks by considering the effects of income, and partial versus general 
equilibrium adjustment. 
The Epple and Sieg (1999) framework has the potential to meet these needs and to 
provide an assessment of the importance of one type of general equilibrium adjustment.  The 
new approach allows unobserved individual heterogeneity in preferences for public goods as 
well as differences in household income to be: (a) incorporated in the estimation of household 
preferences for spatially delineated nonmarket goods; (b) used in the computation of the new 
locational equilibrium from large and locally differentiated changes in public goods; and (c) 
consistently represented in Hicksian welfare measures that account for the change in quality, the 
resulting equilibrium relocation, and the price changes that are required for the new equilibrium. 
The policy background and context for our analysis of EPA’s projections for the ozone 
improvements to take place in the Los Angeles area are described in the next section.  Section 3 
describes our extension of Sieg et al. [2002a]'s model to allow us to revisit EPA’s Prospective 
Analysis.  Section 4 outlines the specific details of our policy evaluation and the results, and the 
last section discusses their more general implications. 
2.  Background 
2.1 Context 
Section 812 of the 1990 CAAA requires periodic assessments of the benefits and costs of 
the regulations intended to reduce the concentrations of criteria air pollutants.  The first 
                                                 
8 The Math-Tech (1983) analysis was in many respects much more sophisticated in its economic methods than 
current practice.  Hedonic property and wage models considered the need to approximate the areas under marginal 
damage functions (see Vol. III, pp. 5-32 – 5-35 and pp. 6-34 – 6-37).  The marginal values as well as the nature of 
the approximation varied with the level of the air pollutant in each location.  Their analysis of household expenditure 
models remains one of the most sophisticated evaluations for policy.  The data used allowed the model to take 
account of differences in environmental conditions, family size, income, prices, and air pollution at the county level 
(see pp. 7-83 – 7-85). Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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Prospective Assessment (U.S. EPA, 1999) estimated the annual human health benefits (in 1990 
dollars) of Titles I through V of the CAAA to be $68 billion in 2000 and $108 billion in 2010.9  
These results imply an approximate per-household annual benefit of $648 and $1,028 in 2000 
and 2010, respectively.10 
The methodology used for these estimates begins with a detailed inventory of the 
baseline emissions for major point and mobile sources under different regulatory regimes.  The 
projected emissions are introduced into comprehensive air diffusion models to produce estimates 
of the ambient concentration for each criteria pollutant included in the assessment.11  For ozone, 
the air pollutant of primary interest here, the spatial resolution varies depending on the region 
where these models are applied.  For urban areas in the western United States, the Urban Airshed 
Model’s (UAM) spatial resolution is either 4- or 5-km grids.  These analyses produce hourly 
ozone concentrations for specific time periods.  As a result, EPA selected a set of design days 
(with weather conditions and other factors that might influence ambient pollution concentrations 
specified) to represent a time span most likely to be relevant to the regulatory standard.  In the 
case of ozone, this set corresponds to conditions yielding the highest concentrations.  In EPA's 
analysis, this ambient concentration was predicted, along with the relevant health effect 
concentration-response functions, using a spatial resolution matching the air quality monitoring.  
The predicted difference in the count of each type of health effect from each of the CR functions, 
comparing with- and without-CAAA ozone condition, is then “monetized” with constant unit 
values to develop benefit measures for pollution reductions.   
                                                 
9 The Titles for the CAAA are given as follows: 
Title I   –  volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) satisfy reasonably available control 
technology and reasonable further progress requirements for ozone non-attainment areas. 
Title II  –  motor vehicle and non-road engine provisions are met. 
Title III – the 2- and 4-year maximum achievable control technology standards are met. 
Title IV – the SO2 and NOX emission programs for utilities are met as relevant for each region of  the United States. 
Title V  –  the permitting system for primary sources of air pollution is implemented as mandated. 
10 In 2000, the U.S. population was approximately 275 million.  In 1993, the average household size was 2.62.  This 
would imply approximately 105 million households, the basis for our per household estimate. 
11 The Prospective Analysis considered ground level concentrations of ozone, particulate matter 10 microns in size, 
particulate matter 2.5 microns in size, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon dioxide.  It also considers acid 
deposition and visibility impacts as well as stratospheric ozone concentrations.   Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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2.2 EPA’s Prospective Assessment for Southern California 
The EPA Prospective Assessment of how the CAAA would affect future air quality 
conditions identified five major source categories for air pollutants: industrial point sources, 
utilities, non-road engines/vehicles, motor vehicles, and area sources.12  For each source, both a 
base-year level of emissions and projected growth of the specific pollution-generating activities 
were developed for 2000 and 2010 in the absence of CAAA requirements.  These projections 
were modified to reflect control assumptions in each of two “future years.”  For volatile organic 
compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxide (NOX), both contributors to ambient ozone, the national 
assessment estimates a 27% reduction due to CAAA’s effects on VOCs in 2000 and a 35% 
reduction in 2010.  For NOX, the reduction is comparable for 2000 (i.e., 26%) and a little larger 
in 2010 (39%). 
Sectoral emission projections were disaggregated to the state/industry level or below.13  
Spatially differentiated emission estimates, at least at the county level, were then introduced into 
one of several air quality models.  Ozone concentrations were estimated using the Urban Airshed 
Model (UAM) and the variable grid UAM (UAM-V).  For the Los Angeles area, the EPA 
analysis supplemented the regional scale modeling results with higher resolution analysis.  As a 
result, ambient concentrations on an hourly basis are available at a 4-km resolution for this area.   
The UAM framework is a three-dimensional, photochemical grid model that simulates 
the physical and chemical processes underlying the ambient concentration of pollutants.  Four 
steps are involved in the computation of these estimates for ambient concentrations: emissions 
are introduced; horizontal diffusion is computed; vertical diffusion and deposition are calculated; 
and, finally, chemical transformations are evaluated for reactive pollutants.  In the relevant ozone 
models for this analysis, these computations are undertaken every few minutes.   
                                                 
12 EPA’s definition for the source categories are given as follows: 
Industrial Point Sources – boilers, cement kilns, process heaters, turbines 
Utilities – electricity producing utilities 
Non-road Engines/Vehicles – air craft, construction equipment, lawn and garden equipment, locomotives, and 
marine engines 
Motor Vehicles – buses, cars, trucks 
Area Sources – agricultural tiling, dry cleaners, open burning, wildfires  
13 Appendix A of EPA [1999] provides a detailed description of the models used in the sectoral emission analysis. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
7 
The EPA air quality modeling for the Los Angeles area also relied on input data from the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) data.14  The EPA projections with 
and without CAAA considered the conditions for two three-day periods (June 23-25, 1987 and 
August 26-28, 1987) with baseline conditions augmented by the emission profiles associated 
with each scenario.  Table 1 summarizes the VOC and NOX emission totals for each scenario in 
Los Angeles.  With the assistance of EPA staff and its contractors, the three analyses undertaken 
for California were interpolated to a consistent 5-km by 5-km grid cell pattern for the study area 
included in our analysis.15  For each scenario, the latitude and longitude of the centroid for all 
cells in California were computed.  Hourly ozone values were summarized for each grid cell with 
10 hourly ozone values (measured in parts per billion) as the 5
th percentile through the 95
th 
percentile of all the modeled hours in the six-day simulation period.  
3.  The Locational Equilibrium Model 
Our policy evaluation uses estimates of the preference parameters for housing and public 
goods based on applying the Epple-Sieg (1999) locational equilibrium estimator to 92 school 
districts in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  A detailed overview of the model, as well as the 
specific features of the data and estimates, are described in Sieg et al. (2002a).  In this section, 
we provide a brief summary of the structure of the model, focusing on how it can be used in 
policy analysis to offer the first benefit transfer.  
                                                 
14 The SCAQMD also was the source for the monitoring data used to estimate our economic model, discussed 
below in section three. 
15 James DeMocker of EPA’s Office of Policy Analysis and Review arranged for these data to be developed.  
Kenneth Davidson of Abt Associates, Inc., developed the specific decile distributions geo-coded by latitude and 
longitude form the three California analyses.  These were: 
San Francisco – August 3-6, 1990: a 4km x 4km urban scale analysis covering San Francisco Bay area, Monterey 
Bay, Sacramento, and a portion of the San Josquin Valley. 
Los Angeles – June 23-25, 1987 and August 26-28, 1997: a 5km x 5km grid covering the South Coast Air Basin 
from Los Angeles to beyond Riverside, including part of the Mojave Desert. 
Rest of California – July 1-10, 1990: a 56km x 56km (regional scale) covering the 11 western-most states. 
See private correspondence Kenneth Davidson, December 17, 2001. 
     Most of our analysis is focused on the South Coast Air Basin, but this additional analysis was required to assure 
the outermost areas of the counties included in our locational equilibrium analysis could be included in the 
evaluation of these policies. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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3.1 Context  
Three aspects of the locational equilibrium model are especially noteworthy for 
applications to non-market valuation.  First, its use of the single crossing property relaxes the 
Willig (1978) condition that many revealed-preference methods have required, along with weak 
complementarity, to recover Hicksian willingness to pay for improvements in non-market 
environmental amenities (see Bockstael and McConnell, 1993).  Second, it readily 
accommodates the spatially differentiated environmental conditions usually associated with 
externalities.  The model estimates preference parameters are based on observed measures of 
public goods and housing prices for each community and the observed sorting of individuals 
among communities.  Third, the same necessary conditions for a locational equilibrium used to 
estimate the preference parameters allow the framework to be used “in reverse.”  That is, with 
estimates for household preferences, including the parameters describing the heterogeneity, it is 
possible to use the model to compute the prices required for any new locational equilibrium due 
to an exogenous change in the vector of spatially delineated public goods.  It is this last feature 
that allows the model to be used for a general equilibrium benefit transfer.  It is possible to 
estimate the baseline market conditions hypothesized to characterize a without-CAAA scenario 
and to consider a change from that baseline to evaluate the “with CAAA” case. 
3.2 Structure of the Model 
The locational equilibrium model is a mixed discrete/continuous framework that 
maintains households’ decisions can be described as involving two stages—the selection of a 
best community and then, conditional on that choice, an optimal demand for the community-
specific good.  In our case, this community-specific good is housing.  Equation (3.1) describes 
the first stage of this hypothesized choice process with mi the ith household’s income; pj, the jth 
community’s price for housing; g(qj,aj), a separable sub-function providing an index, θj, of the 
local public goods, qj and air quality, aj; and αi an unobserved taste parameter.16  By treating  i α  
as a random variable, jointly distributed with income, the model allows for unobserved 
heterogeneity in household preferences for public goods. 
                                                 
16 In the estimation of the model,  ) ( g ⋅  is assumed to be linear with the coefficient of  j q , normalized to unity.  
Thus,  j j j a q γ θ + = . Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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where A = set of communities.  The optimal housing demands for the ith household, hi, 
conditional on  ∗







h ∀ − =  (3.2) 
The locational equilibrium requires a set of prices such that market demand for housing equals 
supply in each community. We omit the subscript i in what follows because households are 
identified through the joint distribution for α and m,  f(α , m). Using this continuous 
formulation, the market equilibrium is defined in equation (3.3). 




∀ ⋅ = ∫ α α ) , ( ) ( ) (  (3.3) 
where  j c  = set of all households such that:  j j*
i =  and Sj (pj) = supply of housing in community 
j.   
A locational equilibrium, with no two communities having the same housing prices, and 
preferences satisfying the single crossing condition, implies a sorting of households as well as an 
ordering of the public goods index (θ = g(.)) and the housing prices across communities that 
satisfy three conditions: boundary indifference, stratification, and ascending bundles.17 
Following Epple and Sieg (1999), we use a preference specification consistent with a 
constant income and price elasticities of demand for housing, and with separability between 
housing and community specific public goods.  Equation (3.4) provides the specific form that is 
consistent with the single crossing condition (dropping the ith subscript for simplicity). 
                                                 
17 These conditions are described in detail in Epple and Sieg (1999).  Boundary indifference refers to the existence 
of households that are indifferent between two communities that have been ranked to adjacent positions based on 
their prices and public goods.  Stratification implies that households are distributed across communities with an 
ordering by income and the taste parameters for public goods.  Ascending bundles implies the level of the index of 
public goods, housing prices (for a homogenous housing unit), and the highest income for each type of taste for 
public goods all increase in the same order. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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3.3 Welfare Measurement 
The locational equilibrium model implicitly bundles two goods—the community, which 
conveys the index of public goods, and homogeneous housing.  The latter is assumed to be 
equivalent across communities.  This feature is central to the development of the price indexes 
for the model (see Sieg et al., 2002b, for further discussion).  The public good index is a weak 
complement to the community in that the individual does not gain from improvements in public 
goods in other communities.  There is, however, no added “consumption of the community” with 
increases in the public goods.  That is, housing demand conditional on community selection is 
not affected by the index of public goods.  Thus, the Willig condition is not needed to limit the 
role of income effects (see Smith and Banzhaf, 2002).18 
The potential significance of relaxing the Willig condition can be gauged using the effect 
of a change in income on the incremental willingness to pay for a specified change in the public 
good.  Equation (3.5) defines the general equilibrium willingness to pay (WTPGE).  We can gauge 
the importance of relaxing these restrictions by considering the responsiveness of the WTPGE to 
income, labeled as WTPm in Table 2 below.  Equation (3.6) demonstrates that WTPm is simply a 
measure of how the policy affects the marginal utility of income. 




k GE p , , m , V p , , WTP m , V θ α θ α = −  (3.5) 
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=  (3.6) 
In order to implement the prospective policy analysis, we need to estimate the model and 
solve for the locational equilibrium under the various scenarios developed for EPA’s Prospective 
Analysis.  In Sieg et al. (2002a) we discuss in detail how to estimate the parameters of this model 
using available data on housing transactions, public goods, and community-specific amenities.  
                                                 
18 The model resolves the issues associated with recovering Hicksian welfare measures for quality changes because 
the necessary conditions for equilibrium provide sufficient information to estimate a price index for quality.  A 
utility-consistent price index that defines when communities are equivalent, or, in other words adjusts for quality 
differences between them, is defined from the boundary indifference condition. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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This paper uses the Sieg et al. (2002a) parameter estimates along with air quality projections 
from the Prospective Analysis that are described in Section 2.  These air quality measures are 
adapted to match the spatial detail of an expanded version of Sieg et al. (2002a) model to 
develop a consistent general equilibrium (GE) baseline set of conditions and GE responses to the 
policies considered in the Prospective Analysis.  
3.4 Using the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Model to Calibrate Market 
Conditions for a General Equilibrium Benefit Transfer 
The logic of using estimates of the parameters describing the joint distribution of income 
and the taste parameter (α) for public goods to compute locational equilibria was developed in 
Sieg et al. (2002a).  We confine our discussion here to three new issues.  First, we consider how 
using the model as a description of market equilibrium with a predefined, inelastic supply of 
housing in each of the original 92 school districts performs when reproducing in-sample and out-
of-sample prices for standardized units of housing in each community.   
Second, we outline the process used to replace one school district (L.A. Unified) with 11 
new school districts.  These new school districts were introduced recently by the L.A. Board of 
Education to decentralize decision-making for local education.  This reduction in the size of the 
largest “community” in our model provides an opportunity to expand the choice set used to 
compute the locational equilibria for the Prospective Analysis.  Finally, we apply our model to 
calibrate the household allocations to match projected 2000 and 2010 conditions without the 
more stringent emission restrictions in EPA’s policy evaluation.  This process defines the 
baseline housing prices and expenditures used to evaluate the added increment in regulations due 
to the CAAA that was considered in the Prospective Analysis.  Without this recalibration it is not 
possible to establish a consistent GE baseline for the distributions of households and prices in 
2000 and 2010.  These “without CAAA” baseline conditions are not observed; they are 
hypothesized reference points that serve as the starting points for computing the adjustments 
associated with the increased restrictions for 2000 and 2010.  
To evaluate how the Epple-Sieg framework would perform in benefit transfer we re-
estimated the hedonic model for the 92 school districts for 1995 using the same specification for 
the price equation and constructed the normalized prices for each school district using the fixed 
effects.  The proportionate change in price indexes between 1990 and 1995 could then be 
compared with two general equilibrium computations—one for 1990 and a second with modified 
ozone conditions so they corresponding to the 1995 concentrations. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
12 
As one would hope, the proportionate changes from the hedonics and the GE 
computations are positively correlated with a statistically significant correlation coefficient of 
0.236 (p-value = 0.024).   
The 1995 GE computations suggested price indexes that were somewhat larger than the 
hedonic estimates.  Nonetheless, this comparison indicates a reasonably high level of consistency 
between the model’s predictions and actual price changes.  With the hedonic model, air quality is 
not the only change during this period and the only variables reflecting these effects are temporal 
fixed effects.  Under these circumstances, a positive, significant correlation between 
proportionate price changes is supportive of the model.  Larger price effects from the locational 
equilibrium model would suggest its price effects may best be considered an outer bound to the 
general equilibrium price effects.  The findings also are consistent with the general economic 
intuition that the computational model does not include the transactions costs of moving. 
The second modification to the model involved replacing the L.A. Unified School 
District with the 11 sub-districts established in April 2000 by the L.A. Board of Education.  
Introducing these new districts provided greater spatial resolution for the largest school district 
used with the original model.  For example, ozone concentrations in 1995 varied from 70 to 121 
parts per billion across the 11 new disaggregated districts.  Thus, this spatial delineation allows 
the model to account for the substantial variation in the ozone concentrations in this area.   
To compute the baseline prices for each district, we calculated the specific measure for 
ozone concentrations for 1990 and the education measure (i.e., the average math scores for the 
1992-93 California Learning Assessment System Grade Level Performance Assessment test) for 
each new district, and used the model to compute the new normalized prices for 1990 as a result 
of these refined estimates for ozone and school quality.  Initial housing supply was implicitly 
defined based on housing expenditures in 1990 reallocated to each of the new districts, assuming 
a constant 1990 baseline price for all of them in the pre-decentralization equilibrium. 
The last step to adapting the model for analysis of EPA’s prospective report was 
computing the 2000 and 2010 locational equilibria for the ozone levels corresponding to no new 
controls as a change from the 1990 levels.  The prices and associated distributions of housing 
expenditures for each school district define the baseline conditions for the policy solutions with 
increased controls.  Figures 1 and 2 plot the 1990 price and index of public goods, θ (labeled as 
“theta” in Figures 1 and 2) along with 2000 and 2010 baseline and control solutions for 
comparison.  As the figures suggest and we discuss in detail below, the improved ozone Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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conditions have a marked effect on the new equilibrium prices, improving, in all cases, the public 
good/price combinations available. 
4.  Reconsidering the Prospective Analysis 
Our analysis had access to the results of three sets of simulations from the air diffusion 
models: (1) baseline runs for ambient ozone concentrations in 1990; (2) ambient concentrations 
in 2000 and 2010, when air pollution regulations are “frozen” at federal, state, and local controls 
corresponding to their 1990 levels of stringency and effectiveness; and (3) concentrations in 
2000 and 2010, when federal, state, and local rules promulgated under the 1990 CAAA are 
implemented (the reduced emission levels presented in Table 1).  Our labeling convention in 
Figures 1 and 2 for the price and public good index (labeled “theta”) as well as in figures 
describing ambient ozone conditions for specific school districts identifies scenario and year (90 
for 1990, 00 for 2000, and 10 for 2010).  The “without CAAA” case is labeled “ba” for business-
as-usual and the second “ct” for control in our graphs.  All of these scenarios were developed by 
EPA staff to mimic the effects on the Los Angeles area. 
Access to these data offers an unusual opportunity.  It is possible to use the framework of 
the Los Angeles-area model (LAM) for a policy analysis with the ambient ozone concentration 
data developed for that assessment.  This section describes three sets of welfare computations: 
(a) average general and partial equilibrium measures of Hicksian willingness to pay, homeowner 
rents, a relocation index (count), and the general equilibrium price and public good changes for 
the area as a whole; (b) average welfare measures for selected school districts; and (c) measures 
of the distribution of gains by income group identified through the LAM framework’s ability to 
track income heterogeneity. 
4.1 The Spatial Implications of the Air Pollution Policies 
The EPA simulations provide distributions for ozone for each latitude and longitude in 
1990, 2000, and 2010.  Figure 3 indicates the geographic scale of these simulations in relation to 
the school districts, which provide the lowest level of spatial resolution for our model.  The 
“dots” falling within the boundaries of each school district identify the number of projected 
ozone distributions from EPA’s air diffusion analysis.  Each is the centroid of a 5-km grid.  Our 
estimated model relied on the average of the 30 highest hourly ozone readings for a year, for 
which we do not have an exact counterpart in the available data.  As a result, we used the 
average across grids in a school district for the 0.95 deciles.  To ensure consistency between the Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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monitored and simulated readings, we constructed school district-specific scale adjustments 
based on the ratio of average monitored ozone readings in 1990 to the average of EPA projected 
concentrations for the 0.95 decile in 1990.19 
Figure 3 labels three of the school districts in our revised choice set with identifying 
numbers.  Figures 4 through 6 present three examples of the average simulated concentrations 
(before adjustment, in parts per billion of ozone).  Each graph provides five empirical 
distribution functions, distinguished by year (1990, 2000, 2010) and air pollution control 
scenario (ba, ct).  These cases illustrate the diversity of conditions across school districts.  In 
some cases, these empirical distributions do not shift with either the year or control conditions.  
In others, there are pronounced differences between ba and ct, but they vary by year.  For 
example, considering the 0.95 decile (the right-most point on each graph) in Figure 4 for the 
Santa Monica/Malibu Unified school district (ID = 102) along the coast (left side of Figure 3) of 
these highest readings, all are below the current 0.12 primary standard (parts per million).  
Moreover, the anticipated changes over time are modest, and closely aligned with the 1990 
levels. Another coastal school district, Long Beach Unified (ID = 89) in Figure 5 displays an 
even more constant pattern of ambient ozone.  By contrast, if we consider a district away from 
the coast, such as Claremont Unified (ID = 75) in Figure 6, the picture is quite different, with 
large changes in the ozone concentrations across scenarios.  Examination of comparable graphs 
based on the Prospective Analysis scenarios for the other 99 school districts reinforces a general 
conclusion that is available from these three graphs.  There is wide heterogeneity in the current 
and projected ozone concentrations as well as in the impact of the ba and ct implications for this 
set of school districts.   
This point is implicitly made in a somewhat different format with Figures 3 and 4.  These 
graphs plot the equilibrium prices and public good indexes for the without- and with-CAAA 
cases in 2000 and 2010, along with the initial baseline 1990 conditions for comparison.  While 
the curves appear close, there are large differences in both of these normalized indexes across 
school districts and between the three sets of solutions.  Movement from left to right of the 
schedule connecting the price/public-good index pairs in each graph indicates that, at each level 
of housing prices, a greater level of the composite public good is available.  The increases in the 
public good index arise because the ozone concentrations are being reduced between the ba and 
                                                 
19 This process parallels EPA’s practice in using their simulations (see EPA [1999], Appendix C, p. C-25). Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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ct cases for some, but not necessarily all, school districts.  These changes are certainly not 
uniform.   
When households are allowed to move in response to these exogenous changes in 
pollution, locational equilibria corresponding to the comparison of the ba and ct scenarios in 
each year will involve a different ordering of price and public good pairs.  From the perspective 
of renters, the horizontal shift of the price/quality locus in the region of their initial location 
choice captures their welfare gain.  It is the shift of the price/quality locus that determines their 
potential to realize a welfare gain from the policy, not necessarily the new price and air quality 
conditions of their initial location choice.   
In the case of large improvement at one or a small number of locations, the impact on the 
location of the entire locus would be minimal.  The improved locations would be reordered along 
the locus, but the locus itself would shift very little—leading to very little welfare gain for the 
renter households.20  This is not the case for owner households, who would capture the impact of 
the quality improvement as it is capitalized into housing prices at their initial location. 
In the large policy changes that we have analyzed, the close clustering of the observations 
between the with- and without-CAAA cases over the mid-range of values for the public good 
index, θ, indicates the relatively modest changes in ozone and limited impact on normalized 
prices for these communities.  Nonetheless, even over this range the relative positions of the 
school districts' price and public good indexes change between the ba and ct solutions.  Figure 7 
reproduces Figure 2, dropping the 1990 solution and identifying the positions of a few of the 
school districts with and without the controls for the 2010 emission profiles.  For example, the 
price/public good combination of school district 89 indicates an increased level of public good 
index but a lower normalized housing price, while that of 102 indicates an increase in both. 
4.2 General and Partial Equilibrium Benefit Measures 
Table 2 illustrates some of the benefit calculations that are possible with the model.  We 
report estimates for each scenario for the area as a whole and a few selected school districts.  Our 
policy comparison provides a baseline by estimating the locational equilibrium model under the 
                                                 
20 This problem resembles the issues posed by Palmquist (19920.  To our knowledge, a tractable method for 
evaluating what is large versus small has not been offered.  The ability to address it within the Epple-Sieg 
framework is another advantage of the model. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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2000 and 2010 business-as-usual air pollution levels (ba00 and ba10).  Next, for comparison, the 
2000 and 2010 (ct00 and ct10) equilibria are estimated under the assumption that the 1990 
CAAA are implemented.  When moving to the new equilibria from the baseline, households can 
move and prices adjust to define the new locational equilibrium.  Thus, our definition for WTP 
must take account of both potential adjustments.   
As equation (3.6) suggested, a general equilibrium welfare measure recognizes that each 
household can experience both new prices and new levels of the composite public good as a 
result of both the CAAA regulations and their relocation to a new school district.  In developing 
these solutions, we assume there are no transaction costs associated with these adjustments.  We 
return to this point below.  Equation (3.6) identifies the prospect for GE adjustments by allowing 
both p and θ to change (with θ
*, p
* designating after ozone change values).  Relocation and the 
policy change imply that households with an initial location can realize change due to either or 
both influences.  As a result, there is the potential for different community subscripts for θ
* and 
p
* versus θ and p on the left and right sides of our definition equation (3.6). 
The computation of our locational equilibrium draws 1 million pairs of α and m from the 
estimated joint distribution.  Our measures of housing expenditures in each school district serve 
to define the available housing supply.  Each benefit measure reported in Table 2 varies with 
household.  They are averages computed for the households (i.e., pairs of α and m) initially 
assigned to each school district.  More formally, the average  j
GE WTP  for school district  j is 
defined in equation (4.1). 




j ∫ = α α α  (4.1) 
where  0
j c  is the baseline community designation and  ) c ( p 0
j  is a measure of number of 
households in  0
j c .  We also compute the average partial WTP defined by allowing only the 
public good index to vary in (4.2).  Households’ adjustments are overlooked. 
) p , , m , ( V ) p , , WTP m , ( V j j j
*
j PE θ α θ α = −  (4.2) 
Table 2 describes both the implications of the policy for ozone concentrations, how these 
are evaluated by the model, and a variety of welfare measures.  The first column reports the 
average proportionate reduction in ozone implied by the with- and without-CAAA scenarios for 
the initially assigned school district (∆ ozone).  ∆θ, in the third column, is the proportionate 
change in the public good experienced by the household (after adjustment) identified by their Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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initial school district.  ∆p, in the second column, is the average proportionate change in prices.  
The variable labeled "count" measures the fraction of the initially assigned households who 
move from their initial school district.  The remaining statistics correspond to the general 
equilibrium willingness to pay relative to income, the levels of the average values for general and 
partial equilibrium willingness to pay (as defined in equations (4.1) and (4.2), respectively) for 
different subsets of the population, ∆ Rent, and the change in willingness to pay with income 
(WTPm defined in equation (3.7)).  ∆ Rent (i.e.,  j j H p p ⋅ − ) (
* ) offers an approximate gauge of 
the importance of the owner/renter distinction.  
There are wide discrepancies between the overall average general equilibrium WTP 
(computed over all school districts) and the WTPGE estimates averaged by the initial school 
district.  Several of the school districts presented in Table 2 were selected to match the graphs for 
the changes in the ozone concentrations.  The full range of average values for 2000, considering 
the WTPGE averaged over all households in each school district, is from $53 (in the Anaheim 
Union High School district) to $1,694 for the Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified.  The differences 
between partial and general equilibrium measures vary with the size and magnitude of the price 
changes, as we might expect.  Average rent changes are less than 20% of the general equilibrium 
willingness to pay for the 2000 comparison, but they are larger for the projected effects of the 
CAAA controls in 2010.  Finally, the implied responsiveness of WTP to income (WTPm) is 
consistently greater than zero.  In contrast, the Willig condition often used in non-market 
valuation requires that WTPm = 0. 
Our estimates for the per-household benefits in 2010 are generally smaller than for the 
ozone concentrations implied by regulatory effects in 2000 if we exclude changes in rents.  
Comparing the WTPGE plus the ∆ Rent for the two years implies that 2010 would have larger 
gains for homeowners than 2000.  Neither our study nor the EPA analysis allows for real income 
growth at the household level to affect the benefit measures.21  Thus, our findings for 2010 arise 
solely from the implied public good and general equilibrium price changes induced by the 
spatially delineated pattern of ozone concentrations for the business-as-usual and control 
scenarios. 
                                                 
21 Thus, there is a subtle contrast between the assumptions used to compute emissions, which assume growth, and to 
compute benefits, which do not.  This difference implies growth in the level of economic activity does not affect real 
income.   Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
18 
4.3 Distributional Effects of Policy 
Table 3 summarizes the WTP estimates comparing without- and with-CAAA in 2000 and 
2010, averaged (across school districts) by income quantile.  As with our other summaries, 
results for 2010 generate lower benefits to all groups and higher rents than those in 2000.  On 
average, the highest income group realizes twice as much in willingness to pay as the lowest 
quantile.  This comparison holds regardless of whether we consider the general or the partial 
equilibrium measures.  In some respects, it understates the heterogeneity in gains by income 
group and location.  Figures 8 graphs the average general equilibrium measures of WTP by 
school district (ranked by income) for the without- and with-CAAA comparison in 2000.  The 
distribution measure labeled A reports the average value for households falling in the 0-to-25% 
interval of the WTP distributions by initial school district.  B, C, and D correspond to 25 to 50, 
50 to 75, and top intervals for the general equilibrium willingness to pay.  
The pattern displayed in Table 3 also is apparent in Figure 8, in that higher benefits are 
experienced with each increase in income, as theory would suggest.  However, the range of gains 
is much wider than what is implied by the overall means, with the lowest community and lowest 
quantile gaining about $33 in 2000 and the second highest school district and quantile at $2,317.  
Thus, heterogeneity in income, taste for public goods, and spatial differences in the implications 
of environmental policy induce a diverse pattern of gains that would be overlooked with area-
wide averages, even when they are disaggregated by income quantile. 
5.  Implications 
The locational equilibrium framework provides a consistent basis for computing benefit 
measures for large and diverse changes in environmental conditions.  The model identifies how 
diverse households (in terms of income and tastes for public goods) adjust to “the environmental 
cards they are dealt” by the combination of policy and nature.  We have demonstrated it is 
possible to develop models that allow general equilibrium benefit transfer; the model matches 
the spatial detail used to describe variations in environmental conditions that characterize most 
large-scale policy analyses and offers a consistent basis for describing how households would 
adjust to such diverse conditions.  As we noted at the outset, current practice uses both the 
damage function and unit benefit estimates in ways that assume households do nothing different 
as a result of the changes to environmental conditions.  This assumption is not only unrealistic, 
but also inconsistent with the revealed preference methods for benefit measurement.  Large 
policy interventions will likely generate different types of adjustments from those “embedded” in Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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the reduced-form ecologic or prospective cohort models used to describe health effects.  
Economic values change as well.  The challenge is in consistently representing the market 
consequences of these adaptations. 
The locational equilibrium model relies on heterogeneity in tastes, the levels of public 
goods, and income to estimate preferences.  When used to consider air pollution, we must 
assume that people recognize local air quality conditions, appreciate the consequences of that 
pollution, and use this information in their decisions about where to live.  Our application may 
well offer the best test case for this set of maintained assumptions.  The Los Angeles Times 
publishes spatially differentiated information about air pollution, including ozone, and its real-
estate guide routinely identifies air quality conditions in different housing areas.  This 
information also is a part of local TV news reports.  Thus, while ozone itself may not be visible, 
a spatially differentiated information base is available for the area as a whole. 
Does this imply that the preference function estimated using a locational equilibrium 
fully captures all the health effects conventionally enumerated in damage functions along with 
the aesthetic effects?  There is no way to directly answer this question until we are able to 
introduce health effects as a set of structural restrictions to preference functions (e.g., as 
household production functions for health).  Such an approach would imply that the damage 
functions affect the consumption choices of private goods (including leisure) in a way that could 
be identified.  At this stage, our estimated preference function allows air pollution to affect 
choices.  The specification does not “explain” why.   
By contrast, the damage function approach measures a physical effect hypothesized to be 
related to pollution concentrations in areas where these health effects are observed.  This strategy 
is limited in a different way.  Epidemiological research isolates the health effects, but it cannot 
“prove” that households recognize them.  Equally important, these physical effects are converted 
to a WTP estimate with unit benefit from avoiding each type of health effect.  This does not 
mean people would pay this amount.  Households at all income levels are assumed capable of 
paying the same unit benefits.  Payments to avoid one type of damage are assumed not to affect 
what could be paid for another type (see Smith et al., 2002, for a discussion of this issue). 
One further qualification to our formulation of the locational equilibrium merits 
discussion.  We assume adjustment is costless.  This is certainly not the case.  It seems 
reasonable to expect that this simplification would overstate the importance of general 
equilibrium effects.  With household adjustment costs, responses would be smaller.  There are 
other feedback effects that we omitted.  With higher costs of production, prices of other goods Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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should change and pollution-related consumption choices for households may change as well.  
For now, we have taken a step toward providing bounds on the importance of adjustment.  This 
is the problem originally posed by Lind (1973) in the literature on spatial externalities (both 
negative and positive) and ours is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to address it in a practical 
policy context. 
At a minimum, the current generation of locational equilibrium models has the ability to 
provide more detailed cross-checks for the conventional benefit estimates.  They also allow 
consistent measurement of partial and general equilibrium benefit measures, and therefore offer a 
simple gauge of the likely impact of adjustment for benefit transfers.  Finally, because the model 
relies on heterogeneity, it also allows consistent measures of the distribution in gains (or losses) 
from policy that can be related to the observable sources of that heterogeneity. 
Our application illustrated that these differences can be substantial.  The estimated annual 
benefits for different groups, as a result of the environmental conditions experienced, their 
income, and their tastes for public goods, can vary by a multiple of more than 50—from about 
$30 to more than $2,000 (in 1990 dollars) for the ozone changes—due to continued 
implementation of the CAAA mandates. 
An important challenge that remains is to determine how these estimates of 
heterogeneous gains, derived by tracking distributional effects, can be used as part of an 
informative assessment of the equity effects of environmental policies. Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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Table 1.  EPA Projected VOC and NOX Emissions for Los Angeles (tons per day) 
Source/  Base  Without CAAA  With CAAA 
Pollutant  1990  2000 2010 2000 2010 
        
VOC        
    Area  758  770 871 607 700 
  On-Road Mobile  1,179  999  1,168  410  213 
  Point        
    Low Level  197  196  196  196  158 
    Elevated  1  3  2  3  2 
        
Total  2,135  1,968 2,237 1,216 1,073 
         
NOX        
    Area  450  467 529 453 463 
  On-Road Mobile  993  1,280  1,573  879  626 
  Point        
    Low Level  216  186  186  139  139 
    Elevated  19  19  12  18  8 
        
Total  1,678  1,953 2,300 1,489 1,236 
Source:  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999).  These estimates were taken from Table C-4. 
 Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
22 
Table 2.  Alternative Benefit Estimates With and Without CAAA for 2000 and 2010 
  ∆ozone  ∆p  ∆θ count  WTPGE/m WTPGE WTPPE  ∆Rent WTPm 
2000           
area-wide -0.128  -0.002  0.014  0.401  0.023  910  817  94  0.102 
Upland Unified (52)  -0.204  0.015  0.021  0.164  0.016  617  541  111  0.076 
Claremont Unified (75)  -0.233  -0.005  0.013  1.000  0.018  676  569  109  0.078 
La Canada Unified (88)  -0.184  0.003  0.015  0.916  0.035  1434  488  -217  0.154 
Long Beach Unified (89)  -0.019  -0.016  0.009  1.000  0.028  1084  676  126  0.116 
Santa Monica/Malibu Unified (102)  -0.106  -0.012  0.009  0.254  0.040  1629  1025  606  0.165 
"Area B" new LA Unified Sub-district 
(201) 
-0.208 0.015 0.017 0.142  0.027  1076  1006  137  0.123 
           
2010           
area-wide -0.107  -0.001  0.013  0.274  0.022  846  679  180  0.095 
Upland Unified (52)  -0.180  -0.027  0.003  0.020  0.017  651  711  -122  0.071 
Claremont Unified (75)  -0.204  -0.015  0.008  1.000  0.009  651  332  323  0.073 
La Canada Unified (88)  -0.205  0.022  0.019  1.000  0.028  1135  2005  -901  0.132 
Long Beach Unified (89)  -0.009  -0.023  0.006  0.000  0.027  1070  387  710  0.113 
Santa Monica/Malibu Unified (102)  -0.187  0.008  0.016  1.000  0.033  1383  1839  -472  0.150 
"Area B" new LA Unified Sub-district 
(201) 
-0.181 -0.003 0.011  0.000  0.010  1075  380  784  0.118 Resources for the Future  Smith, Sieg, Banzhaf, and Walsh 
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Table 3.  Willingness to Pay by Income Quantile 
Policy Scenario/Quantile  m  WTPGE WTPPE  ∆Rent 
       
2000       
First Quantile  22,478  604  543  62 
Second Quantile  33,400  793  712  82 
Third Quantile  41,675  961  863  100 
Fourth Quantile  58,216  1,282  1,151  133 
       
2010       
First Quantile  24,443  560  451  118 
Second Quantile  33,376  736  593  154 
Third Quantile  41,611  891  717  187 
Fourth Quantile  58,101  1,189  956  249 
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Figure 1.  Computed General Equilibrium Prices for With and Without CAAA 2000 
Compared to Baseline 1990* 
 
                                                 
* The legend follows the format described in the text.  “Theta” refers to the value for the index of public goods (θ).  
p is the price of normalized housing, “ba” refers to the “without CAAA”, and “ct” the “with CAAA.”  90 refers to 
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Figure 2.  Computed General Equilibrium Prices for With and Without CAAA 2010 
Compared to Baseline 1990* 
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Figure 3: LAM School Districts and EPA UAM Locations for Estimated Ozone Readings 
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Figure 4: A Comparison of Projected Ozone Concentrations for Santa Monica-Malibu 
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Figure 5.  A Comparison of Projected Ozone Concentrations With and Without CAAA for 
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Figure 6: A Comparison of Projected Ozone Concentrations With and Without CAAA for     
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Figure 8: Average Willingness to Pay by Income Quantile in Each School District 
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